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The object of this paper is to study the evolution of trade costs and of the agglomeration
of production, as well as their relation. The Home Market E⁄ect prescribes increas-
ing agglomeration when trade costs decrease because it is supposed to strengthen. We
study the joint variation of trade costs and agglomeration in all the sectors that we con-
sider, and speci￿cally in those which support the home market e⁄ect hypothesis. We
employ an original approach based on the combination of di⁄erent bootstrap distribu-
tions. Our analysis yields insights into the evolution of trade costs and agglomeration
in Europe in the last decade.
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21 Introduction
Over the last two decades trade theorists have devoted much e⁄ort to the understanding
of how trade costs condition trade patterns. As Anderson & van Wincoop (2004) explain,
the group of costs which actually a⁄ect trade is large and di¢ cult to disentangle. Shipment
costs play an important role, but other factors raise the cost of consuming a product in
a di⁄erent location. Border-related formalities, technical and non-technical barriers, tari⁄s
and standards, trade insurance and ￿nancing are just some other members of the trade costs
family. In many regards, globalization and trade costs are the two sides of the same medal.
Indeed, many believe that the large increase in trade observed during the last decades has
been possible thanks to the evolution of communication and transportation technologies,
evolution which has turned trade costs down. A big step forward which made proclaim
the death of distance (Cairncross 1997). Even though trade costs have truly decreased over
time (Jacks 2009), distance still matters (Disdier & Head 2008) and trade costs continue to
condition trade ￿ ows signi￿cantly.
Production activities are not equally spread throughout the geographic space. As a matter
of fact, agglomeration patterns always emerge (Brulhart & Traeger 2005). Patterns are a
constant for some real activities such as manufacture, but they are common for immaterial
activities too. There are many factors which cause activities to agglomerate in speci￿c
locations or to settle as far apart as possible from others. Resource endowments, economies
of scale, infrastructures availability are just some possible explanations. In this paper we
focus on agglomeration from a trade theory perspective (Combes et al. 2008).
Under the new focus on trade costs, New Trade Theory models have generated predictions on
how trade costs a⁄ect the agglomeration of production. Proximity to consumers is thought
to in￿ uence ￿rms￿location decision according to a mechanism known as Home Market E⁄ect
(hereafter, HME) (Helpman & Krugman 1985). Accordingly, ￿rms prefer to settle close to
consumers because trade costs are proportional to distance and they in￿ uence the market
price and ￿rms￿mark-up (Melitz & Ottaviano 2008). A recent theoretical paper by Behrens
et al. (2009) shows that if one controls for the e⁄ect of "geographic di⁄erences￿(Relative
Centrality) and of "di⁄erences in productivity" (Comparative Advantage), agglomeration
might truly follow the HME also in a multi-country world. In this case the HME predicts
that when trade costs decrease, agglomeration increases consequently because the HME
strengthens; a general empirical test of this dynamic is provided by Head & Ries (2001) for
North America and by Niepmann & Felbermayr (2010) for the OECD countries.1
In this paper we study the evolution of trade costs and of the agglomeration of production
at the sectoral level (2-digit ISIC rev.3) in the EU countries in the period 1995-2006. Our
1Given the di⁄erent possible causes of any observed agglomeration pattern, a relation between trade
costs and agglomeration is not to take for given. To wit, if agglomeration occurs because ￿rms settle in a
region to exploit that region￿ s factor endowment, trade costs are not likely to a⁄ect that sector￿ s pattern of
agglomeration. Trade costs might also in￿ uence agglomeration through other channels. For example, lower
trade costs might decrease a ￿rm￿ s incentive to settle in the large market with respect to another location￿ s
comparative advantage in ￿scal terms. Given that trade-costs are less binding, the ￿rm could serve the large
market from a close-by ￿scal-advantageous country.
3interest in the evolution of these two variables has as theoretical reference the HME theory
and its prescription of an inverse relationship between the two. However, we are interested
in the evolution of trade costs and agglomeration regardless of the HME hypothesis. Indeed,
given deepening integration in the EU during the period under consideration (to wit, the Euro
was introduced in 1999), we want to check whether and how trade costs and agglomeration
have changed and if it is possible to establish a connection between the two. Afterwards, we
will also consider how these two entities evolve when the HME hypothesis holds in a speci￿c
sector.
The contribution of this paper consists in our sectoral study of the evolution of trade costs
and agglomeration, and of their interaction. We devise an original test of the sign of the joint
variation between trade costs and agglomeration which exploits di⁄erent bootstrap distrib-
utions. Their relationship is also analysed through a regression analysis which, di⁄erently
from the literature, does not use production and demand shares whereby avoiding any simul-
taneity bias. Furthermore, our analysis provides information about the net change of trade
costs and agglomeration in the period under analysis, and the test of the HME hypothesis
suggests in which sectors it is likely to hold. The paper is structured as follows: in section
2, we brie￿ y introduce the data used; in section 3, we study trade costs and agglomeration;
in section 4, we test the HME hypothesis in our sample of sectors; in section 5, we draw
the main conclusions. In appendix 1, we provide a detailed discussion of the data used in
the analysis. Appendix 2 introduces an alternative approach to test the sign of the joint
variation discussed in section 3.3.
2 Main features of the data
The empirical analysis discussed in this work uses a data set which considers twenty-one
sectors of activity. These sectors are: "Mining and Quarrying" (ISIC Rev.3 10-14), "Elec-
tricity, Gas and Water Supply" (ISIC Rev.3 40-41), 18 subsectors of the manufacture ag-
gregate (ISIC Rev.3 15-37), and "Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry" (ISIC rev 3 01-02);
the full list of sectors is in Table 1. Our group of countries consists of the EU-15 countries
before the May 2004 enlargement. All the data are for the 1995-2006 period, yearly ￿gures.
For analytic convenience, we will consider four subperiods de￿ned as: period 1, 1995-1997;
period 2, 1998-2000; period 3, 2001-2003; period 4, 2004-2006. In section 3.1 we account
for trade costs through an indicator computed using bilateral export and national trade.
Agglomeration in section 3.2 is computed using employment ￿gures at the NUTS-2 regional
level; for the agglomeration analysis "Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry" is not available
(sector 21 in Table 1). To test the HME hypothesis in section 4, we use value added and
domestic absorption ￿gures computed as production plus import less export. All the data
have the sector k, country i, year t or period p dimension; bilateral export has also the
partner j dimension. More information on the data are in appendix 1.
4[TABLE 1 about here]
3 Trade Costs and Agglomeration
The objective of this section is twofold. Firstly, we study the evolution of trade costs and
agglomeration separately and calculate their overall net change. Afterwards, we consider (i)
their joint sequential variation to asses how one evolves given the other￿ s speci￿c change in
one direction, and check (ii) whether and at which extent variations of trade costs explain
variations in the agglomeration pattern. Accordingly, in subsection 3.1 and 3.2 we consider
the evolution of trade costs and agglomeration across the ￿rst (1995-97) and last period
(2005-2006) to draw conclusions about their net evolution, while in sections 3.3 and 3.4 we
consider their sequential evolution between all the periods available (P1, P2, P3, P4) in order
to study their interaction.
3.1 Trade Costs
In our analysis we account for trade costs through an indirect measure known as trade free-
ness (TF) (Head & Mayer 2004), this is an indicator of bilateral trade costs computed using
bilateral export and national trade. The TF quanti￿es trade costs through the di⁄erence
between foreign and domestic trade, assuming that this di⁄erence depends only upon re-















ij;t is country i￿ s export of k to j in year t, and xk
ii;t is country i￿ s national trade,
computed as country i￿ s total production less total export of k in year t.
Implicit to its construction is the hypothesis of symmetric trade barriers (TFij = TFji). The
TF ranges in the 0-1 interval, where TF = 0 indicates prohibitive trade costs and TF = 1
indicates free trade; domestic trade is assumed to be free (TFii = 1).To wit, for TF = 0:5
(very high level, compare with Table 3) the product of bilateral trade (numerator) is one-forth
the product of national trade (denominator). In Table 2 we report summary statistics for
TF k
ij;t and in Figure 1 we plot the across-sectors and pairs average of TF k
ij;t (TF k
ij;t ) TFt).
From Table 2 it emerges that the bulk of TF values is below the 0.15 level (95th percentile);
the mean value is only 0.035 and the median value 0.009. Then, trade costs as accounted
by the TF indicator are high among the EU-15 countries.3 Figure 1 shows that the mean
2The role of preferences is completely disregarded by the TF indicator. For a discussion of how the
di⁄erence between imported and domestic consumption is due to the combined e⁄ect of preferences and
restrictions to trade, see Anderson & van Wincoop (2003).
3Our values are in line with the ones reported by other authors. For a comparison, see Niepmann &
Felbermayr (2010) Figure 2b and Table 9, or Head & Mayer (2004) Table 5.
5trade-freeness (TFt) has decreased from 1995 to 2001 and risen again afterwords.
[TABLE 2 about here ]
[FIGURE 1 about here]
For the purpose of our analysis, we average the yearly bilateral TF values along two dimen-
sions: ￿rst, to obtain a unique sectoral estimate of the index (TF k
ij;t ) TF k
t ), second, to
obtain average values for 4 subperiods of 3 years each (TF k
t ) TF k
p ). Then, we consider the
TF evolution from the ￿rst to the last period: ￿TF k = TF k
p4 ￿ TF k
p1. ￿TF k > 0 indicates
a trade costs decrease, ￿TF k < 0 viceversa. Average TF values for the whole period (1995-
2006), the 4 subperiods and the time di⁄erence are in Table 3; the subperiods values are
plotted in Figure 2 to display the temporal evolution. The lowest TF value (highest trade
costs) is for sector 20 "Electricity, gas and water supply", the highest TF value (lowest trade
costs) is for sector 13 "manufacture of o¢ ce machinery and computers". It comes with no
surprise that trade costs impact relatively less sector 13. Indeed, this is a high value-added
sector where products are realized in large plants and shipped at low cost to several markets
for sale.
[TABLE 3 about here]
[FIGURE 2 about here]
To study the evolution of trade costs as quanti￿ed by the TF indicator, we refer to the
￿TF k values in Table 3. However, these di⁄erences could be not statistically signi￿cant (to
wit, they might emerge because of measurement errors), we therefore employ a statistical
procedure to check their signi￿cance. As discussed in Brulhart & Traeger (2005), bootstrap
for hypothesis testing is an appropriate approach in this case.4 We generate two distributions
of the indicator through a bootstrap simulation, one for each period. Then, we calculate the
di⁄erence of the paired values and generate the distribution of the di⁄erences; this is used
to test the hypothesis ￿TF k = 0. The column ￿TF k in Table 3 reports the outcome of the
bootstrap-based test using asterisks.5
Given non-normality of the bootstrap distribution in the bulk of sectors, we resort to Bias-
corrected and Accelerated Con￿dence Intervals (BCA-CI) to de￿ne rejection areas.6 The
system of hypotheses is "H0 : ￿TF k = 0" against "H1 : ￿TF k 6= 0". Signi￿cant trade
costs variations emerge in 14 out of nineteen sectors available: sectors 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10,
11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 21 exhibit a signi￿cantly positive variation. Then, whenever TF changes
4We refer the reader to Cameron & Trivedi (2005) chapter 11 for more information about the Bootstrap.
5We instruct 1000 replications for the bootstrap, then the distribution counts 1000 observations. We
check normality through the Shapiro-Francia Test (Shapiro & Francia 1972); normality supported in sectors
3, 7,15. Sectors 13 and 20 not available for bootstrap-computation given the high number of missing values.
6For a discussion of the di⁄erent con￿dence intervals for hypothesis testing available in this context, see
Diciccio & Romano (1988).
6signi￿cantly, this re￿ ects a trade costs reduction. We expected a generalized TF increase
because the period under analysis comprises the implementation of many EU integration
policies (￿rst of all, the Euro￿ s introduction in 1999). Nonetheless, the analysis shows that
some sectors were una⁄ected.
3.2 Agglomeration of Production
The distribution of production is uneven throughout the geographic space. Agglomera-
tion emerges because of di⁄erent causes and, usually, it can be explained through direct
and evident arguments such as infrastructure availability, manufacture tradition, resource
endowments, etc. By abstracting from speci￿c cases, New Economic Geography models
(Baldwin et al. 2005) provide a formalization of these processes and stress the role of trade
costs. For the purpose of our analysis, we need to measure agglomeration through a synthetic
index which quanti￿es how much each sector is far away from an even distribution over the
geographic space.
Agglomeration can be measured in absolute or relative terms through concentration indices.
An industry is concentrated in absolute terms if the bulk of its production takes place only
in few locations (no other sector considered), while it is in relative terms if its geographic
distribution is concentrated with respect to the average distribution of all the other sectors
considered (Haaland et al. 1999).7 Since we are interested in scale economies and trade, we




















where 0 ￿ ThIk ￿ logR, xk
r is activity x (employment, production, value-added, etc.) in




r is the across- regions
average and each region belongs exclusively to one country i (i = 1;:::;M).
As for trade freeness, we consider the evolution of agglomeration ￿ThIk = ThIk
p4 ￿ ThIk
p1,
where ￿ThIk > 0 indicates an increase in agglomeration. To compute the index and obtain
its between/within decomposition, we use regional employment for the ￿rst twenty sectors
listed in Table 1.9 The index is calculated both for the whole time-span (12 years, from 1995
to 2006) and for 4 subperiods of 3 years each. The index values are reported in Table 4 and
7The two measures coincide for a group of geographic units of identical size, but they do not if geo-units
di⁄er in size. For a discussion of absolute and relative concentration, see Ca￿so (2009).
8The Theil Index is obtained through the formula of the Generalized Class of Entropy Indices when the
sensitivity parameter ￿ = 1 (Brulhart & Traeger 2005). If ￿ = 2 one obtains the Half Square Coe¢ cient of
Variation. The more positive ￿ is, the more sensitive the index to di⁄erences at the top of the distribution,
the less it is, the more sensitive the index to di⁄erences at the bottom of the distribution.
9In case of relevant productivity di⁄erences across regions and sectors, the use of employment ￿gures
might bias the indicators of agglomeration. For this reason some authors prefer using value added ￿gures
(Behrens et al. 2005). We use employment because this is available at the Nuts-2 regional level for the
sectors, countries and years to match with the trade data. Besides, we reckon that such di⁄erences are not
particularly relevant in our analysis because we consider a homogenous set of countries. In the Eurostat
Regio data set, employment ￿gures were not available for sector 21 "Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry".
7plotted in Figure 3.
[TABLE 4 about here]
[FIGURE 3 about here]
Agglomeration is lowest for sector 2 "manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco"
and highest for sector 3 "manufacture of textiles, textile products, leather and footwear".
From the between/within decomposition, it emerges that concentration is mainly due to
agglomeration within countries. The highest share of within contribution -minimum of
between- is for "manufacture of coke, re￿ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel￿(sec-
tor 6), while the lowest -maximum of between- is for "manufacture of wood and products of
wood and cork, ...￿(sector 4).10 It comes with no surprise that sector 6 has the highest share
of within concentration, this sector enjoys large scale economies but it is strategic for each
country. Then, production is highly concentrated within countries but not at the European
level. On the contrary, given its resource-based feature, sector 4 might be concentrated in
areas which fall over di⁄erent countries.
As for the evolution of agglomeration between the ￿rst (1995-1997) and the last period (2004-
2006), column ￿ThIk in Table 4 reports the time di⁄erence of the Theil Index. To check the
statistical relevance of the variation (H0 : ￿ThIk = 0), we employ a bootstrap-based test
as the one discussed in the previous section for trade freeness. We resort to bias-corrected
and accelerated con￿dence intervals again to de￿ne rejection areas; the test results are in
Table 4.11 A signi￿cant change occurs in 7 out of twenty sectors: sectors 1, 7, 11,12, 13, 16
exhibit a signi￿cantly negative variation (agglomeration decreases), while sector 3 exhibits a
signi￿cantly positive variation. On the whole, agglomeration does not increase in the period
considered, it is either stable or decreasing. This is an important result which confutes the
common belief of increasing agglomeration in manufacture.12
3.3 The Sign of the Joint Variation
In this section we consider the sequential evolution of trade freeness and agglomeration to
assess in which direction one of the two has changed given a speci￿c variation of the other.
More in details, we are interested in knowing for which sectors TF and agglomeration have
changed in the same direction (TF " - ThI " or TF # - ThI #) and for which in the opposite
direction (TF # - ThI " or TF # - ThI "). The time-di⁄erences of TF and agglomeration
10When the within contribution is higher than the between, concentration depends mainly upon an uneven
distribution within countries; the across-countries distribution is relatively less unequal. To wit, if a sector
were spread unevenly between countries but equally among the regions of each country, concentration would
depend only upon across-countries diversity.
11The Shapiro-Francia test (Shapiro & Francia 1972) signals a normal distribution for sectors 3, 4, 5, 6,
8, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19. We use again BCA-CI for coherence with the TF test. As a matter of fact,
non-normality does not bias the Z-test since we get the same sectoral outcome when we refer to rejection
areas based on the normal distribution. This holds both for trade freeness and agglomeration.
12This result is likely to depend upon the country-sample considered. Indeed, the sample consists of
advanced economies with a consolidated structure of manufacture, countries from which manufacture is
moved away for destinations outside the EU-15 block.
8between P4-P3, P3-P2 and P2-P1 are reported in Table 5 and plotted in Figure 4 to provide
descriptive-analysis evidence regarding the sign of the joint variation.13
[TABLE 5 about here]
[FIGURE 4 about here]
For sectors in portion I (X-axis and Y-axis positive) and III (X-axis and Y-axis negative)
of Figure 4, TF and agglomeration evolve in the same direction: positive TF changes are
associated with positive changes in agglomeration and vice versa. This is the case for 34 out
of sixty pairs.14 Figure 4 is useful to gain a ￿rst insight, but we need to employ a statistical
procedure to test the robustness of the sign. To wit, it could be that the sign of the observed
di⁄erences is determined by few non-relevant observations, while there is not a statistically-
signi￿cant information about the sign of the co-movement. This is what we aim to check
now through a formal statistical procedure.
We build our testing-strategy on the consideration that if trade freeness and agglomeration
evolve in an opposite direction (TF # - ThI " or TF # - ThI "), the product of their variation
is negative, otherwise it is positive. In the columns c; f; i of Table 5, we report ￿TF k and
￿ThIk and the sign of their product Rk for each period/sector combination. We check the
sign of Rk through hypothesis-testing based on a bootstrap-generated distribution.
The bootstrap distribution (Rk
b) of Rk comes from combining the bootstrap distributions of
￿TF k and ￿ThIk discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2. The Rk
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where, as de￿ned before, ￿TF k
b = TF k






b values are the product of bootstrap-generated values, b = 1;:::;B where B is the
total number of replications instructed for the bootstrap.15 To test the sign of Rk using the
Rk
b distribution we employ a non-parametric approach; an alternative approach for the same
objective is discussed in Appedix 2. The non-parametric approach used here is based on the
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b is a binary variable which has a Bernullian
13Values plotted in ￿gure 4 are those in column ￿TFk and ￿ThIk of table 4 and 5.
1420 pairs -one for each sector- for the di⁄erences between P4-P3, twenty for P3-P2 and twenty for P2-P1.
15As for the Rk
b distribution, it is not normal even in those sectors where ￿TFk
b and ￿ThIk
b are normally
distributed. The product of two normal distributions is not a normal distribution, but it is known as Normal
Product Distribution.
9distribution, but Jk is binomially distributed. We actually run two tests based on the Jk
statistic, the hypothesis system for each of the two tests is:
1. "H0 : Jk = 1=2" against "H1a : Jk > 1=2"; rejection area for Zk
1 > z￿:
2. "H0 : Jk = 1=2" against "H1b : Jk < 1=2"; rejection area for Zk
1 < ￿z￿:
z￿ is the critical value of the standard-normal for a signi￿cance-level equal to ￿. Indeed, we
use the standard-normal approximation of the Binomial distribution because B is su¢ ciently
large. The null-hypothesis states that the portion of positive cases is not di⁄erent from half:
there is no clear information about the sign of the joint variation. Obviously, H1b is admissible




Jk ￿ p0 q
p0(1￿p0)
B
where p0 = 1=2 since we test "H0 : Jk = 1=2": The results based on the Zk
1 test-statistic
when ￿ = 1% are in Table 6.
[TABLE 6 about here]
Non-rejection of the null hypothesis is for 4 out of ￿fty-two tests executed. Rejection in
favor of a change in the same direction (H1a) is for 27 out of forty-eight sectors; rejection
in favor of a change in the opposite direction (H1b) is for 21 out of forty-eight sectors.
Consequently, both variables seem more likely to change in the same direction, but they
have often changed in the opposite direction too. As for evidence at the sectoral level, only
sectors 4 and 11 keep constant their evolution throughout the time-span considered (trade
freeness and agglomeration evolve in the same direction); the other sectors alternate between
variations in the same and in the opposite direction.
3.4 The Relationship between Trade Costs and Agglomeration
In the previous section we have studied the evolution of trade costs and agglomeration to
understand in which direction they are likely to move when both change. In this section we
want to check if there is a relation between the evolution of trade costs and agglomeration.
In other words, we want to know if trade costs contribute to explain agglomeration. As a ￿rst
insight into the relationship between trade costs and agglomeration, we combine trade costs
and agglomeration indicators by sector and period in Figure 5 to visualize their relationship
through a scatter-plot.16
[FIGURE 5 about here]
Higher agglomeration levels are associated with higher trade freeness values, the trend line
is upward sloped in all four periods. We build on the information in Figure 5 by developing
16Values plotted in ￿gure 5 are those in column TFall and ThIall of table 3 and 4.
10formal regression analysis of ThIk
p and ￿ThIk
p on TF k
p and ￿TF k
p respectively. We aim to
check if there is a signi￿cant causal relation from trade costs to agglomeration. We perform
both OLS-pooled and within estimations, the estimation output is in Table 7 for the values
in level and in Table 8 for the di⁄erences.
[TABLE 7 about here]
[TABLE 8 about here ]
From the estimation output it emerges clearly that trade costs contribute signi￿cantly to
explain agglomeration both in levels and in di⁄erences. Given the output of the F-test on
the relevance of longitudinal heterogeneity, the panel-within estimator is more reliable for
the estimation in level. The estimate of the coe¢ cient is around 1 for the value in levels and
around 0.73 for the di⁄erences (within estimation output).17 As expected, the regression
￿t decreases from levels to di⁄erences, but it remains signi￿cant anyway. Then, for a TF
increase (trade costs decrease) we may reasonably expect that agglomeration increases. This
￿nding is consistent with the results of the sectoral test for the joint variation (section 3.3).
Indeed, trade-freeness and agglomeration evolve signi￿cantly in the same direction in the
bulk of cases considered (27 out of forty-eight).
We mark the importance of this result derived from an analysis where it is possible to exclude
any simultaneity bias. Indeed, agglomeration (the dependent variable) is generated through
employment data, while trade costs (the independent variable) through bilateral-trade data.
This is not the case for other studies in the literature where the relationship between trade
costs and agglomeration is analysed through production and demand shares.
4 Trade Costs and Agglomeration under the HME hy-
pothesis
As mentioned in section 1, New Trade Theory models which embed the HME predict that
decreasing trade costs boost agglomeration because the HME itself is supposed to strengthen.
In this section we test whether or not this dynamics takes place in sectors which support the
HME hypothesis. We proceed sequentially to achieve this objective. Firstly, we discuss the
home market e⁄ect in a multicountry framework as recently modelled by Behrens et al. (2009)
and show that decreasing trade costs involve increasing agglomeration in their framework.
Secondly, we test in which sectors the HME hypothesis holds and check whether the sign of
the joint variation is positive for those sectors.
17Trade costs remain signi￿cant under the 10% threshold both in levels and in di⁄erences when using
robust standard-errors. Observations are 80 for the estimation in level and 60 for the one in di⁄erences.
114.1 The Home Market E⁄ect in a multi-country world























where ￿i is country i￿ s production share, ￿i is country i￿ s demand share, we consider M
countries and ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿M. Condition 5 does not usually hold in the real world
because third-country e⁄ects o⁄set ￿rms￿large-country motivation to settle in a speci￿c
location. In particular, Behrens et al. (2009) refer to di⁄erences in relative centrality and
Ricardian comparative advantage.18 Nonetheless, they show that when it is possible "to
separate the e⁄ect of relative centrality and comparative advantage on the one side, from
the impact of relative demand driven by relative size and relative wages on the other side"
(Behrens et al. (2009), page 263) condition 5 is likely to hold. They demonstrate this by






which prevail in the case of no comparative-advantage
and no centrality-advantage through a linear ￿lter to apply to the equilibrium shares (￿
￿
i) of
their model under speci￿c conditions.19 The authors explain that for the ￿
SA
i shares equation










where ￿ij = ￿ (equal trade freeness for any country pair) and ￿i is country i￿ s share of world
demand.




strengthen the HME towards the
largest country. This is made clearer through the following numerical example where in case
B trade is freer than in A (trade freeness parameter from 0.40 to 0.45):
￿ Case A: M = 3;￿ = 0:40;
￿1= 0:45 ! ￿
SA
1 = 0:683 ! ￿
SA
1 =￿1= 1:517
￿2= 0:30 ! ￿
SA
2 = 0:233 ! ￿
SA
2 =￿2= 0:773
￿3= 0:25 ! ￿
SA
3 = 0:083 ! ￿
SA
3 =￿3= 0:332
￿ Case B: M = 3;￿ = 0:45;
￿1= 0:45 ! ￿
SA
1 = 0:763 ! ￿
SA
1 =￿1= 1:695
￿2= 0:30 ! ￿
SA
2 = 0:218 ! ￿
SA
2 =￿2= 0:726
￿3= 0:25 ! ￿
SA
3 = 0:045 ! ￿
SA
3 =￿3= 0:180
In Behrens et al. (2009) the HME strengthens when trade costs decrease because the less
trade costs impact pro￿t maximization, the more ￿rms settle in the large market (by so
18When demand is equally distributed across regions, locations with a relative advantage in terms of better
centrality and higher productivity always attract a larger share of production.
19These conditions require a quite unlikely bilateral trade-costs structure which guarantees production in
all M countries (interior solution of the model).
12increasing agglomeration) and serve periphery through exports. On the contrary, if trade
costs are prohibitive, the motivation to stay close to each portion of consumers (not only to
the largest one) is stronger.20
4.2 Test of the HME hypothesis
We are now interested in testing the HME hypothesis sector by sector in order to check what
the joint variation is when the HME hypothesis holds. We achieve this by verifying condition
5 in each sector through Behrens et al.￿ s (2005) approach. They develop three tests based





and use Spearman￿ s rank correlation coe¢ cients; the tests are
non-parametric and use the observed production and demand shares. Here, we apply only
one of their test (the most powerful) and Spearman￿ s coe¢ cients.





















where k stands for the sector considered, i and j are two (a pair) of the M countries consid-
ered, ￿
k stands for sectoral production share and ￿ for overall demand share. The total num-
ber of Zk
ij equals the number of combinations of M countries taken by two. If B > 0;country
i￿ s demand share is larger than country j￿ s; the HME requires A to be positive as well.
Zk
ij > 0 therefore supports the HME. If B < 0, country i￿ s demand share is less than country
j￿ s; the HME requires A to be negative. The product of two negative quantities is positive,
consequently Zk
ij > 0 always supports the HME. Building on Zk
ij, Behrens et al. (2005) de￿ne
the Pairwise-Average Z-test, the Country-Average Z-test and the World-Average Z-test. The

















ij = 1 if Zk
ij > 0 and
+
Zk
ij = 0 if Zk
ij ￿ 0; N = M(M ￿ 1)=2 the number of
combinations. The test checks whether Zk
ij is positive in more than half cases through Sk
1. Sk
1
is the fraction of favorable cases over the total. The system of hypotheses is "H0 : Sk
1 = 1=2"




i . The former are the
equilibrium shares derived in Behrens et al.￿ s (2009) theoretical model, the latter are the accessibility-￿ltered
shares derived from the ￿rst under speci￿c conditions. However, in our analysis we use observed shares which
come from real data, we name them ￿i; these are the real counterpart of the equilibrium shares ￿
￿
i: From
Behrens et al. (2009) one realizes that if she uses ￿i to test the HME hypothesis, this is not likely to hold
unless third-country e⁄ects are irrelevant.
21The strongest test of the HME is the Pairwise Z-test, the Country Average and the World Average
follow. The pairwise test is the strongest because, di⁄erently from the other two, it does not sum across
individual Zk
ij values. Then, it cannot be the case of many small negative observations to be o⁄set by some
few positive ones.
13against "H1 : Sk
1 > 1=2"; rejection of H0 in favour of H1 supports the HME hypothesis. Sk
1
is binomially distributed: Since the number of pairs (available combinations) is su¢ ciently





1 ￿ N ￿ p + 1
2 p
N ￿ p ￿ (1 ￿ p)
where N = M(M￿1)=2, p = 1=2 and (1=2) is the continuity correction for the approximation
of the discrete binomial to the continuous normal distribution. We also compute Spearman￿ s
rank-correlation coe¢ cients between the series ￿
k
i=￿i and ￿i (Conover 1999). The coe¢ cients
are instrumental to testing the independency hypothesis between the two series; positive
(and possibly signi￿cant) correlation values signal support of the HME hypothesis. The test
results and Spearman￿ s coe¢ cients are in Table 9.22
[TABLE 9 about here]
Spearman￿ s coe¢ cients signal positive correlation (support the HME hypothesis) for ￿fteen
out of twenty-one sectors; however, only for four sectors the correlation is statistically sig-
ni￿cant at 5 percent. The strongest correlation is for "manufacture of fabricated metal
products" (sector 11). The Pairwise Z-test signals that the HME hypothesis holds in eleven
out of twenty-one sectors (5% signi￿cance); strongest evidence is again for sector 11.23 For
these eleven sectors, Spearman￿ s coe¢ cients are always positive.
4.3 The HME and the evolution of trade costs and agglomeration
At this point we check whether and for which sectors the prescription of an inverse rela-
tionship between trade costs and agglomeration holds when the HME hypothesis is valid. If
the prescription holds, we should observe a positive sign of the joint variation (alias, inverse
relationship holds) in the eleven sectors which support the HME hypothesis. In Table 9, we
report the number of cases when the joint variation is positive by sector; the test is available
only for nine of the eleven sectors where the HME hypothesis is valid.
For sector 11, the inverse relationship emerges in three out of three cases available, for sectors
7, 8, 10, 19 in two out of three cases available, while for sectors 12, 14, 16, 18 only in one
case. On the whole, the prescription of an inverse relationship is weakly supported by the
data. Our analysis shows that it is far to be a robust prescription and that it needs to be
checked sector by sector. This result is against the HME theory.
22We report results only for the Pairwise-Average Z-test, results for the Country and World-Average tests
are available upon request.
23The sectors which support the HME hypothesis are: sector 7 "manuf. of chemicals and chemical prod-
ucts", 8 "manuf. of rubber and plastic products", 10 "manuf. of basic metals", 11 "manuf. of fabricated
metal products, except machinery and equipment", 12 "manuf. of machinery and equipment n.e.c", 13
"manuf. of o¢ ce machinery and computers", 14 "manuf. of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.", 16
"manuf. of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks", 17 "manuf. of motor vehicles,
trailers and semi-trailers", 18 "manuf. of other transport equipment", 19 "manuf. of furniture; manufactur-
ing n.e.c".
145 Conclusions
The objective of this work was to produce evidence on how trade costs and agglomeration of
production interact. We developed our analysis on the prescription of an inverse relationship
between trade costs and agglomeration when the Home Market E⁄ect takes place. Even
though we have used the HME case as a reference, we were interested on trade costs and
agglomeration regardless of the HME validity because their relationship is relevant in any
case.
The strength of our analysis is twofold. Firstly, we study the joint variation of trade costs and
agglomeration at the sectoral level by using an original testing approach based on bootstrap
simulations. Secondly, we develop a regression analysis which avoids any likely simultaneity
bias.
Our analysis suggests that the net evolution of these two entities depends speci￿cally upon
the sector considered. On the whole, trade costs seem to have decreased while agglomeration
shows a non-increasing trend. As for the interaction of trade costs and agglomeration, they
are more likely to move in an opposite direction but results depend on the speci￿c sector
considered in this case too. Even when the HME hypothesis holds, an inverse relationship
between trade costs and agglomeration is not to take for given. Furthermore, we ￿nd evidence
that trade costs contribute to explain the observed levels of agglomeration as well as its
evolution. To conclude, we believe previous aggregate analyses to hide the fragility of an
inverse relationship between trade costs and agglomeration, fragility which clearly emerges
in our sectoral study.
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17Appendix 1. Data
Throughout the paper we consider twenty-one sectors of activity classi￿ed according to ISIC
rev.3/NACE 1.1, these sectors are: -a- the aggregate for "Mining and Quarrying￿(NACE:
C, ISIC:10-14), -b- 18 subgroups of manufacture as partition of the "Total Manufacturing￿
aggregate (NACE: D, ISIC: 15-37; see Table 1 for the list of all the sectors), -c- the aggregate
for "Electricity, Gas and Water Supply￿(NACE: E, ISIC: 40-41), and -d- the aggregate for
"Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry" (NACE: A, ISIC: 01-02). The countries comprised
in the analysis are those in the EU-15 group: Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
and the United Kingdom. Data for Belgium and Luxembourg are recorded together for
the so-called Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU). The time range is 1995-2006,
whole-period ￿gures are the average of all the yearly observations. We use values for four
sequential sub-periods de￿ned as follows: period 1 values are the average of 1995-1997 ￿gures,
period 2 of 1998-2000, period 3 of 2001￿ 2003 and period 4 of 2004-2006.
Trade Freeness and Agglomeration
To calculate the sectoral Theil Index we use employment ￿gures (number of employees) at
the Nuts-2 regional level; data are extracted from the Eurostat Regio data set. We start with
207 Nuts-2 regions: Austria, 9 regions; Belgium, 10 regions; Germany, 38 regions; Denmark,
5 regions (5 deleted); Spain, 19 regions (8 deleted); Finland, 5 regions (1 deleted); France,
22 regions; Greece, 13 regions (1 deleted); Ireland, 2 regions; Italy, 21 regions; Luxembourg,
1 region (1 deleted); the Netherlands, 12 regions; Portugal, 5 regions; Sweden, 8 regions;
United Kingdom, 37 regions. Some regions were deleted in case of too-many missing values.
Employment data for sector 21 "Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry" were not available in
the Eurostat Regio data set, we therefore did not consider this sector for the agglomeration
analysis.
For the trade freeness indicator we use bilateral export among the EU-15 countries which
constitute our sample, plus National Trade ￿gures computed as "total production less total
export". All ￿gures are in current US dollars. Bilateral export, total production and total
export are extracted from the OECD Stan database.
Production and Demand shares for the HME
To test the HME we used sectoral-production and aggregate-demand country shares. Pro-
duction shares are calculated using sectoral value-added ￿gures, we use Domestic Absorption
to account for demand. Domestic absorption is computed as "production less export plus
import￿ . Value added, national production, export and import in US dollars are extracted
from the OECD Stan database.
18Appendix 2. A percentiles-based Test of the Sign
The test of the sign (discussed in section 3.3) checks whether the portion of positive obser-
vations is statistically larger than half for deciding about the sign of the Rk statistic. In
this context, the word statistically makes the di⁄erence. Indeed, if we were not looking for a
statistically-signi￿cant result, one might simply check what is the percentage of positive ob-
servations over the total (B); and conclude that Rk is positive if more than 50% observations
are positive. This reduces to observe the median of the distribution. The issue with this
approach is that the median might be just one position away from zero. Then, a conclusion
based only on the sign of the median could lead to a non-robust statement about the sign
of Rk. We propose now an alternative way to decide about the sign of the Rk statistic.
In the spirit of hypothesis-testing based on Percentiles Con￿dence Intervals (Cameron &
Trivedi (2005) section 11.2.7), one may de￿ne bu⁄ers around the median which guarantee
to decide about H0 at a certain robustness-level. We de￿ne these bu⁄ers ￿ as follows: when
￿ increases, the rejection area decreases; we get more restrictive on rejection of H0. We opt
for this de￿nition because it guarantees that more evidence is required to opt for either sign
of the statistic when larger bu⁄ers are used. We consider three standard levels: ￿ = 1%,
￿ = 5% and ￿ = 10%, and de￿ne respectively the rejection areas in the following Table 10.
[TABLE 10 about here]
The rationale behind the de￿nition of the rejection areas for H0 is that when at least
(50 + ￿)% observations are positive (negative), one can assume that Rk is positive (neg-
ative) at a robustness-level equal to ￿%. On the contrary, one concludes that the sign is not
distinguishable (at a robustness-level equal to ￿%) if there is not enough evidence.24 We run
the two tests discussed in section 3.3 using ￿ = 5%; the two tests are:
1. "H0 : Jk = 1=2" against "H1a : Jk > 1=2"; rejection area for 45p > 0.
2. "H0 : Jk = 1=2" against "H1b : Jk < 1=2"; rejection area for 55p < 0.
Results based on this approach are in Table 6. Rejection of the null-hypothesis for the same
alternative is exactly for the same cases as for those selected by the Zk
1 statistic (￿ = 1%).
24It is to notice that the robustness-level ￿ is inversely related to the signi￿cance level ￿ used in standard
hypothesis testing as applied in section 3.3. In the former, the lower is ￿ the more likely the rejection of H0
is. On the contrary, in conventional hypothesis testing, the lower is ￿; the less likely the rejection of H0 is.
19Tables and Charts
Table 1: Sectors of Activity
Sector Nace 1.1 Sector Name
Number ISIC rev 3
1 C, 10-14 Mining and quarrying
2 D, 15-16 manuf. of food products, beverages and tobacco
3 D, 17-19 manuf. of Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
4 D, 20 manuf. of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture;
manuf. of articles of straw and plaiting materials
5 D, 21-22 manuf. of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing
6 D, 23 manuf. of coke, re￿ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
7 D, 24 manuf. of chemicals and chemical products
8 D, 25 manuf. of rubber and plastic products
9 D, 26 manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products
10 D, 27 manuf. of basic metals
11 D, 28 manuf. of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
12 D, 29 manuf. of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
13 D, 30 manuf. of o¢ ce machinery and computers
14 D, 31 manuf. of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
15 D, 32 manuf. of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
16 D, 33 manuf. of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
17 D, 34 manuf. of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
18 D, 35 manuf. of other transport equipment
19 D, 36 manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c
20 E, 40-41 Electricity, gas and water supply
21 A, 01-02 Agriculture, hunting and forestry
Notes: ￿ sector 21 is not available for the analysis of agglomeration.
20Table 2: Trade Freeness, summary statistics.
sec mean min max p50 iqr p5 p95
1 0.00792 1.98E-07 0.29210 0.00208 0.00642 0.00002 0.03101
2 0.01736 2.49E-04 0.50727 0.00637 0.01372 0.00054 0.06754
3 0.08167 1.58E-03 0.98252 0.03611 0.07159 0.00339 0.33165
4 0.01332 4.19E-06 0.31361 0.00456 0.00844 0.00018 0.06098
5 0.01515 3.63E-05 0.23039 0.00744 0.01339 0.00075 0.05747
6 0.02339 5.73E-07 0.91860 0.00506 0.01617 0.00002 0.07947
7 0.07671 1.30E-03 0.98201 0.03378 0.07365 0.00279 0.32332
8 0.03395 2.31E-04 0.80879 0.01522 0.03414 0.00142 0.12783
9 0.01217 5.27E-05 0.22000 0.00476 0.01177 0.00036 0.04975
10 0.07092 8.71E-05 0.97016 0.03348 0.06808 0.00185 0.29623
11 0.01105 2.50E-05 0.13189 0.00492 0.00898 0.00052 0.05111
12 0.04805 8.57E-04 0.75270 0.02416 0.04826 0.00298 0.16426
13 0.19093 2.84E-04 0.97799 0.07578 0.24522 0.00598 0.72742
14 0.05391 3.99E-04 0.92431 0.02715 0.05412 0.00232 0.19227
15 0.08233 7.30E-05 0.91629 0.02926 0.08594 0.00122 0.37948
16 0.06513 7.55E-04 0.81816 0.03994 0.06645 0.00345 0.21045
17 0.09874 5.02E-06 0.89268 0.04285 0.14493 0.00146 0.32461
18 0.04979 4.68E-05 0.68285 0.01772 0.04719 0.00126 0.22424
19 0.01955 1.53E-04 0.28260 0.00720 0.01612 0.00056 0.09172
20 0.00306 1.07E-08 0.04653 0.00042 0.00290 0.00000 0.01542
21 0.01169 3.34E-06 0.71168 0.00238 0.00791 0.00006 0.04477
Total 0.03567 1.07E-08 0.98252 0.00983 0.03014 0.00032 0.15215
Notes: ￿ "p50" is the Median, "iqr" id the 75-25 interquantiles range, "p5" is the 5th , "p95" is the 95th .


















































TFy Upper and Lower CI values
21Table 3: Trade Freeness by sector.














1 0.0078 0.0094 0.0045 0.0055 0.0088 0.0006y
2 0.0169 0.0205 0.0144 0.0138 0.0146 0.0059*
3 0.0965 0.1234 0.0855 0.0572 0.0773 0.0461*
4 0.0131 0.0151 0.0111 0.0120 0.0126 0.0025*
5 0.0150 0.0175 0.0137 0.0129 0.0140 0.0035*
6 0.0228 0.0304 0.0216 0.0175 0.0179 0.0125*
7 0.0923 0.1206 0.0634 0.0532 0.0798 0.0408*
8 0.0483 0.0383 0.0262 0.0245 0.0458 -0.0075y
9 0.0120 0.0137 0.0101 0.0105 0.0120 0.0017*
10 0.0884 0.0904 0.0561 0.0795 0.0483 0.0421*
11 0.0110 0.0126 0.0096 0.0098 0.0111 0.0015*
12 0.0483 0.0651 0.0435 0.0387 0.0396 0.0254*
13 0.2301 0.1981 0.1574 0.2553 0.2448 -0.0467 na
14 0.0911 0.0627 0.0675 0.0618 0.0824 -0.0198y
15 0.1050 0.0775 0.0863 0.1195 0.0814 -0.0038y
16 0.0662 0.0797 0.0550 0.0546 0.0685 0.0113y
17 0.1022 0.1322 0.0989 0.0808 0.0669 0.0653*
18 0.0491 0.0598 0.0495 0.0477 0.0325 0.0273*
19 0.0213 0.0288 0.0204 0.0179 0.0192 0.0096*
20 0.0016 0.0038 0.0014 0.0011 0.0013 0.0025 na
21 0.0109 0.0136 0.0088 0.0080 0.0090 0.0046*
Notes: ￿ Bootstrap-based test:"y" signals no rejection of "Ho: dfTF=0"
against "H1:dfThIk 6=0" at 5%, "*" signals rejection, "na" stands for test-
output not available. ￿ column a reports the whole-period average of TF,
column b the value for period 4, column f the di⁄erence value between P4 and P1.





























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234
22Table 4: Theil Index by sector.
a b c d e f
sec ThIall ThIp4 ThIp3 ThIp2 ThIp1 ￿ThIp4:p1
1 0.735 0.644 0.652 0.756 0.837 -0.193*
2 0.320 0.315 0.313 0.326 0.327 -0.011y
3 1.084 1.153 1.087 1.042 1.036 0.117*
4 0.436 0.433 0.425 0.434 0.452 -0.019y
5 0.480 0.466 0.473 0.487 0.489 -0.023y
6 0.934 1.003 0.906 0.916 0.911 0.092y
7 0.702 0.688 0.683 0.699 0.736 -0.048*
8 0.506 0.500 0.496 0.503 0.524 -0.024y
9 0.477 0.500 0.491 0.459 0.458 0.042y
10 0.707 0.702 0.688 0.704 0.727 -0.025y
11 0.546 0.534 0.530 0.546 0.574 -0.040*
12 0.622 0.612 0.616 0.618 0.642 -0.030*
13 1.065 0.911 0.921 1.094 1.135 -0.224*
14 0.612 0.612 0.594 0.608 0.629 -0.017y
15 0.720 0.782 0.706 0.694 0.693 0.089y
16 0.646 0.622 0.629 0.647 0.687 -0.065*
17 0.787 0.763 0.848 0.773 0.758 0.006y
18 0.640 0.638 0.642 0.633 0.648 -0.009y
19 0.557 0.566 0.527 0.558 0.576 -0.010y
20 0.453 0.462 0.444 0.438 0.464 -0.002y
21 na na na na na na
Notes: ￿ Bootstrap-based test:"y" signals no rejection of "Ho: dfThIk = 0"
against"H1:dfTIk 6=0"at 5%,"*" signals rejection. ￿ column a reports the
whole-period value of the index, column b the value for period 4, column f
the di⁄erence value between P4 and P1.
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p 2.55 (0.33)*** 1.00 (0.29)***





Notes: ￿*** p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ￿ conventional st. errors in parenthesis.






p 0.83 (0.22)*** 0.73 (0.21)***





Notes: ￿*** p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ￿ conventional st. errors in parenthesis.























































0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Trade Freeness -levels- by sector (trade costs)
P1 ThI-TF P1 trend P2 ThI-TF P2 trend
P3 ThI-TF P3 trend P4 ThI-TF P4 trend
Table 9: Test of the HME hypothesis.
sec PW-Zt SM-rh No.CV+ sec PW-Zt SM-rh No.CV+
1 0.50 -0.03 2/3 11 0.87** 0.83** 3/3
2 0.35 -0.42 2/3 12 0.78** 0.71** 1/3
3 0.45 -0.14 2/3 13 0.67** 0.41 na
4 0.57 0.18 3/3 14 0.60* 0.25 1/3
5 0.53 0.05 1/3 15 0.55 0.08 1/3
6 0.33 -0.38 1/3 16 0.66** 0.38 1/3
7 0.62* 0.26 2/3 17 0.76** 0.70** na
8 0.73** 0.63* 2/3 18 0.69** 0.53 1/3
9 0.37 -0.33 1/3 19 0.62* 0.35 2/3
10 0.69** 0.45 2/3 20 0.56 0.15 na
21 0.36 -0.37 na
mean 0.58
Notes: ￿"PW-Zt" reports the statistic of the Pairwise-Av. Z-test, "SM-rh" reports
Spearman￿ s coe¢ cients. ￿* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 ￿ "No.CV+" reports the number of positive
joint variations.
Table 10: Rejection Areas
H0 : Jk = 1=2 ￿ = 1% ￿ = 5% ￿ = 10%
alternatives # rejection area # > rejection area # > rejection area #
H1a : Jk > 1=2 p49 > 0 p45 > 0 p40 > 0
H1b : Jk < 1=2 p51 < 0 p55 < 0 p60 < 0
H1 : Jk 6= 1=2 p49:5 > 0 j p50:5 < 0 p47:5 > 0 j p52:5 < 0 p45 > 0 j p55 < 0
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